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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1970

Let's Put Plea Discussions--

and Agreements--On Record
Chief Justice Robert C. Underwood*
Much has been written about the validity of a "negotiated" guilty
plea,' including several analyses of the wisdom of the practice in general. 2 Although it appears that these questions may not yet be completely resolved at the theoretical level, it is clear that the practice is
being used by a great number of prosecutors in connection with a considerable number of the guilty pleas entered.'
* Mr. Justice Underwood is Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
1. The terminology used in the area has been rather interesting. The plea itself
generally has been called a "negotiated plea" (e.g., Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea,
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, November 1967, at 70) or a "bargained plea" (e.g., State v. Larkins, 450 P.2d 968
(Wash. 1969)), while the process which results in the plea has been given a number
of different labels: "plea bargaining", Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 50 (1968); "plea copping", Kuh, Plea Copping, 24 N.Y.
COUNTY B. BULL. 160 (1966-67).
The American Bar Association has deemed the label
important enough to make it an issue. They expressly prefer the phrases "plea
discussions" and "plea agreements" to describe those practices which would be permitted under their minimum standards for criminal justice. AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 3, 62 (Approved Draft 1968) (hereinafter cited as
ABA PROJECT).
One writer considers these an improvement and suggests an
additional term, "plea recommending". Owens, Plea Bargaining . . . Agreeing ...
Recommending? 26 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 55, 57 (1967).
2. A commentator, free to espouse what "ought to be", may suggest abolition of
plea bargaining. Alschuler, supra note 1, at 52. However, most judicial opinion reflects an awareness of the limited role that the judicial branch plays in the allocation of
resources, and therefore proceeds upon the assumption that plea bargaining will continue to be necessary. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 138 (7th Cir.
1968) (Kiley, J., dissenting). But see People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d
777, 797-98 (1968) (Levin, J., concurring). Thus a judge may recognize the common
usage of plea bargaining practices and yet question their wisdom. Rigby v. Russell,
287 F. Supp. 325, 331 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
3. Guilty pleas account for a high percentage of the convictions. The United
States Supreme Court recently noted in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, n.7,
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The purpose of this article is not to re-evaluate the practices but
rather to propose that a record be made of any plea discussions, the
understanding of the parties as to those discussions, and the terms of
any agreement reached. Such record should be sufficient to apprise the
trial and reviewing courts as to the beliefs of the parties arising from
those discussions. This assumes, as this writer believes, that plea discussions or agreements do not per se render a guilty plea void, a position
that is supported by a majority of the cases.4 However, it is not claimed
that every promise or inducement is valid merely because it is incorporated into the record.' Rather, the writer believes that substantial
amounts of criminal litigation could be avoided, and, when an appeal
is taken, a more informed appellate review would be possible if an
adequate record were made prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea.
It may be helpful at the outset to place the problem and these comments in context. The suggestions herein made and the supportive
arguments are by no means entirely unique. In some respects they are
quite similar to those contained in the "Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty" (Approved Draft, 1968) of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice.6 While the principal
(1969), that during 1968 approximately 86% of the convictions obtained in United
States district courts were pursuant to the plea of guilty or nolo contendere. During
1968 approximately 86% of the Illinois defendants convicted of felonies pleaded guilty.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, 1968 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

There is little empirical evidence on the percentage of the total number of guilty
pleas which are negotiated pleas. The results of the survey of prosecutors conducted
by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review showed that over 86% of those responding do engage in plea bargaining. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises
by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 897, (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV.]. Of those responding to the question "Out
of all guilty pleas handled through your office, approximately what percentage are bargained pleas?" over 42% indicated 50% or more were bargained pleas. Id. at 899 (a
more detailed breakdown is contained therein).
There is considerable non-empirical evidence on the widespread use of plea bargaining. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F. 2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Cortez v. United States,
337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); Barber v. Gladden,
220 F. Supp. 308 (D.C. Ore. 1963), alf'd, 327 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1964); Shelton v.
United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion); Semon v.
Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Utah 1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v.
Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966); Alschuler, supra note 1; ABA PROJECT,
supra note 1, at 3-5, 60-78, ("substantial number" at 60).
4. E.g., Kinney v. United States, 391 F.2d 901 (1st Cir. 1968); Ganger v. Peyton,
379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967); State v.
Jennings, 104 Ariz. 3, 448 P.2d 59 (1968); People v. Darrah, 33 11. 2d 175, 210
N.E.2d 478 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.
2d 699 (1966); Garrison v. Rhay, 74 Wash. 101, 449 P.2d 92 (1968). But see Scott
v. United States, 349 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1965) citing Shelton v. United States, 356
U.S. 26 (1958); Application of Buccheri, 6 Ariz. App. 196, 431 P.2d 91 (1967).
5. For example, a plea induced by a promise to discontinue improper harassment
would not be valid even if the promise were of record. See Owens, supra note 1, at 56.
6. The specific requirements of determining whether the plea is a result of prior
plea discussions or agreements and disclosing the terms of the agreement is contained
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purpose of this article is not a re-evaluation of the practices prevalent
in plea bargaining, it would, perhaps, clarify the balance of this article
if my personal views on the plea bargaining process were known to the
reader.
While in my opinion plea bargaining does not, per se, invalidate a
subsequently entered guilty plea, the more difficult question is the
extent to which judicial participation in this process is permissible. The
proposed standards incorporated in the ABA draft (§3.3) would permit judicial participation only upon request by the parties and only at
the time defendant appears to enter his plea. Judicial participation
would be limited to a statement by the bench of its willingness or unwillingness to follow a recommended disposition, subject of course to
subsequent disclosure of then unrevealed factors which, in the court's
opinion, would necessitate a departure from the recommended disposition. Subsequent revelation of such factors in a pre-sentence report
or otherwise would be justification for a disposition different from that
indicated by the judge, but he must then so advise the 7 defendant and
request him to either affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty.
As a theoretical proposition I incline to agree that a judge should
not be a party to the plea bargaining process at any stage.8 Unfortunately, this question, like most others, must be resolved on a realistic,
pragmatic basis. The fact of the matter is that a very substantial
majority of criminal and quasi-criminal cases in metropolitan areas are
disposed of by pleas of guilty,9 and that such pleas are not entered
until the defendant has achieved what his counsel and he consider to
be the most advantageous disposition possible in the form of prosecution
in Section 1.5. A more detailed discussion of the basis for and advantages of such a
procedure is contained in the commentary to §3.1, p. 60.
For a similar proposal, see Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 894-95;
PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION

ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF

JUSTICE,

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); Scott v. United States, -

F.2d

-, (D.C. Cir. 1969) (37 U.S.L.W. 2463) (seemed to hold it required by Fed.
Rule 11). There has been some judicial opinion on the advisibility of an adequate
record of these matters: United States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 134, 138 (7th Cir.
1968) (Swygert, J., concurring and Kiley, J., dissenting, respectively); United States
ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508, 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
7. ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, at §3.3(b). This was a change from the
Tentative Draft which provided that at the time a different disposition was made the
judge "shall state for the record what information in the presentence report contributed
to his decision not to grant these concessions." (Tent. Draft, 1967). Apparently the
Tentative Draft did not contemplate an opportunity for defendant to withdraw his plea
solely because the court did not grant the concessions.
8. Accord, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1968)
(Swygert, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689
(1969); Comment, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1082 (1967).
9. See note 3, supra.
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recommendations. There are no completely reliable statistics known to
me which indicate the extent of judicial participation in such plea discussions; 10 however, my conversations with trial judges in metropolitan
areas lead me to believe that in a very substantial number of such cases
the defendant has some form of assurance that the recommended disposition resulting from the plea bargaining process will be honored by
the judge.
This process is recognized, even by those trial judges who do not
like it, as necessary if the flood-tide of criminal litigation is to be kept
anywhere within manageable limits. I suspect they are right, and that
an adamant attitude of non-participation in plea discussions by all
judges in metropolitan areas would result in wholesale demands for
jury trials with which our judicial system, now back-logged with civil
cases, would be completely unable to cope."
Largely for practical reasons, therefore, I incline to view as permissible a somewhat greater degree of judicial participation in the plea
bargaining process than do the ABA standards. But I do so only
on the premise that such participation disqualifies the judge to try the
case in the event a trial is necessary. It seems to me somewhat unrealistic to expect a judge who has participated to some extent in plea
discussions to thereafter set completely aside the information gained in
such discussions and try the case with the same degree of objectivity
otherwise possible. It does appear from the committee comments on
section 3.3 of the ABA approved standards that the most persuasive
arguments against judicial participation in plea discussions are the accompanying loss of judicial objectivity and the possible impression on
the part of the defendant that he cannot thereafter secure a fair trial
from that judge. The Committee does indicate its serious consideration, and ultimate rejection, of the alternative of permitting participation conditioned upon subsequent disqualification of the judge for trial
purposes. The stated reasons for rejection of this alternative (that
any other trial judge would then know that a prior tendered plea disposition had been rejected) are not, to me, particularly persuasive. It is,
of course, true that the judge ultimately presiding at trial might well
know generally that a prior plea disposition had been rejected, but it is
10. The closest empirical data available would appear to be the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review survey. The results of that survey, which are published as a

percentage of the prosecutors, not of the cases, indicate that judges are present at some
bargaining sessions. Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 905.
11. The study cited above reported that over 85% of the prosecutors responding

who engaged in plea bargaining felt the percentage of guilty pleas would decrease if
plea bargaining were eliminated. Id. at 899.
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unlikely that he would have knowledge of the details thereof-and it
seems to me that it is principally the detailed knowledge gained from
participation in plea discussions which results in impairment of judicial
objectivity.
It is, therefore, my conclusion (not because I like it or consider it
desirable, but because I consider it a practical necessity) that, to the
extent requested by the parties and considered appropriate by the
judge, judicial participation in plea discussions should be permitted.
Preferably, this would occur only after tentative agreement had been
reached by the parties, but I would not prohibit such participation prior
thereto, if requested by the parties and considered appropriate by the
judge. This conclusion is premised, however, on the condition that a
subsequent trial, should trial become necessary, must be before a different judge.
The theme of this article, as earlier noted, is that plea discussions
and agreements should be of record, at least in summary agreed
form, and that substantial benefits to both the prosecution and defense, as well as the judicial system, would accrue from such procedure.
The volume of post-conviction proceedings and appellate review stemming from plea bargaining would be reduced for two reasons. First,
as will be shown later, errors do occur merely because one or more of
the parties was mistaken as to the agreement reached. Under this
proposal, the plea would not be accepted until all parties had agreed
that no bargaining had transpired, or, if there had been some .agreement reached, the exact terms thereof were of record. Apart from the
reduction of errors, a full and agreed record of the bargain, or lack of
it, would forestall much litigation which now eventually concludes
either with an affirmance of the conviction, because no error was committed, or a remandment necessitated by the absence from the record
of an adequate basis for reviewing the allegations made by the defendant. Frequently such remandments for evidentiary hearings are followed by further appeal and review with ultimate affirmance of the
conviction, all or much of which would have been eliminated had there
originally existed an adequate record of the plea negotiations.
The appellate review that would continue to stem from allegations
of impropriety surrounding plea negotiations (I make no claim that
an adequate record will end all review of these matters) could be much
more intelligently and efficiently decided than is possible without such
a record. Frivolous appeals, as well as unfulfilled promises and similar
errors, would be readily apparent. Even apart from those instances in
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which there existed no factual dispute, a sufficient record would aid the
reviewing court in a consideration of the integrity of the practices actually
used.'" In addition to the benefits to defendants and judges from the
presence of an adequate record, counsel would be protected from subsequent contentions that they had misinformed their clients.
Particularly in recent years the Illinois trial and reviewing courts have
experienced a flood of post-conviction litigation in which allegations of
incompetency of trial counsel have been almost uniformly made by the
defendant. Not infrequently these allegations include claims that defendant was told by his attorney prior to entering his plea that certain
prosecution or judicial promises had been made. Trial court disposition of the case, however, was not in accordance with the alleged promises." Ordinarily the trial record is devoid of reference to these matters, and attempted resolution of them several years later by evidentiary
hearings at which witnesses' memories are dimmed, or key witnesses
are dead or unavailable, is at best an unsatisfactory solution. Nor is
it always a safe assumption that an uneducated, unsophisticated defendant, whose case is being disposed of in a manner more prejudicial
to him than he had been told would be true, is going to have the courage
to speak up and say so. Many judges, including myself, have disposed
of such cases at least in part on the basis of the defendant's silence in the
presence of what he much later claimed to be coercive circumstances or
unfulfilled promises. However, I suspect all of us would have been
happier with our decisions had the defendant's later contentions been
refuted by an adequate record of the plea negotiations. 4 This is not
12. The legal profession has changed its attitudes toward negotiated pleas from
one of general opposition to the qualified approval the practice enjoys today.
Alschuler, supra note 1, at 51. Because of this change of philosophy, there has been
little appellate review of current bargaining practices until recently. ABA PROJECT,
supra note 1, at 63-64; State v. Crenshaw, 183 Neb. 449, 161 N.W.2d 502 (1968).
One critic of the negotiated plea system predicts that unveiling the system will reveal
its undesirability and lead to its gradual abolition. People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186,
162 N.W.2d 777, 792 (Levin, J., concurring).
13. E.g., People v. Riebe, 40 Il. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968).
14. Many of us have cited the "have any promises been made"-"No, sir" colloquy
as the basis or at least support for a conclusion that no promises were made. State
v. Popejoy, 450 P.2d 411 (Ariz. App. 1969); People v. Morris, (No. 41471, Ill.
Sup. Ct., not as yet filed); People v. Barnes, II Mich. App. 455, 161 N.W.2d 398
(1968); State v. Borough, 279 Minn. 199, 156 N.W.2d 757 (1968).
There have been
cases, however, where the inconclusive nature of a colloquy has been recognized. See
State v. Ortiz, 77 N.M. 751, 427 P.2d 264 (1967) (permitted the defendant to withdraw
plea after promise was broken in spite of the typical colloquy); Smith v. People, 162
Colo. 558, 428 P.2d 69 (1967) (court went on to determine whether the promise had
been fulfilled even though there was the typical colloquy and an affidavit that no
promise had been made). Both views are represented in People v. Granello, 18 N.Y.2d
823, 222 N.E.2d 393, 275 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1966), where the Court of Appeals in a 5-2
decision held that the typical colloquy is not conclusive proof that in fact no promises
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to say that an imprisoned defendant's delayed allegations of misunderstanding, misrepresentations, and alike must be viewed as gospel; of
course, they need not be. Indeed the similarity between such allegations and those upon which some recent appellant has succeeded in
securing a remandment is often striking. I am, however, reasonably
certain that every judge would rest more easily if all possibility of truth
in those allegations was refuted by an adequate record of what was
actually done.
This proposal constitutes an additional step in the procedure generally in use now. We have evolved, and quite properly, from:
Court: Has your attorney explained to you all of your constitutional rights?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
to a more comprehensive examination of the defendant, and a much
more detailed explanation by the court of his rights.", This judicial
inquiry at the time the plea is accepted affords the defendant an additional explanation of his rights if his attorney had in fact previously
explained them to him. If the attorney had not, or if the defendant
subsequently alleges that his attorney did not, this judicial admonition,
and the record of it, would preclude the defendant from later alleging
that he did not knowingly waive those rights.
The rights to indictment by grand jury, trial by jury, confrontation of
witnesses, and similar rights, are either knowingly waived or they are
not (this is not to suggest that the line between the two answers is always that easily drawn), but the plea bargaining problem is more complex. There may or may not have been plea discussions. If an agreement was reached, the precise terms as well as the identity of the parties
thereto may need clarification, and it must be determined that the defendant's understanding of those terms was the same as that of the other
parties. Plea bargaining as occasionally practiced is fraught with an
additional shortcoming-the charade which sometimes takes a form
similar to the following:
Court: [often aware that a promise has been made and sometimes
a party to the agreement] Have any promises or inducements been
offered to prompt this plea?
Defendant: [usually aware of any promise when one has been
made (always aware of a promise according to the allegations made
were made. The dissent indicated, in view of defendant's answer, that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to inquire into the matter beyond the
colloquy and ensuing plea.
15. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-4 (1967); 11. S. Ct. R. 401.
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in those
cases which reach appellate litigation on this point)]
6
sir.

1

No,

It is not entirely clear why this charade persists, but most probably
a combination of several factors account for it. States attorneys have
public relations problems, i.e., an indignant community may vent its
wrath upon a prosecutor who, faced with an aroused public and weak
proof, acknowledges in open court that he has agreed to less punishment than the maximum provided by law. Secondly, some prosecutors
may have a vague feeling that plea negotiations are inherently evil and
somehow endanger the validity of the plea. Certainly this danger is
many times enhanced when such negotiations have occurred and the
record does not adequately reflect them. A third factor may be the
feeling that while private litigation may be disposed of on any basis
agreed to by competent parties, the State should not compromise its
prosecution of the wrong-doer. It is always possible that there may be
present factors other than these-such as the fact that trial of a case
will reflect unfavorably upon entirely innocent persons-which either the
prosecution or defense may wish to avoid without making a public statement thereof.
The true basis for disposition of a criminal case should always be
such that it can be preserved in the record. A simple statement by the
prosecutor summarizing the agreement or advising that none existed,
which is verified, supplemented or corrected by the defendant and his
attorney, would neither unduly extend the record nor consume an inordinate amount of time, particularly when compared to the extensive
resources necessitated by post-conviction or appellate review.
An examination of cases reveals that an adequate trial court record,
specifying the existence or non-existence of a plea agreement, and any
terms thereof, would act both to decrease and simplify appellate
and trial court post-conviction litigation. A close look will reveal that
in each of the following categories of cases such record would have
been helpful to one or more of the parties.
I. Promises by prosecutors, in exchange for a plea of guilty, to
do acts within their discretion, i.e., dismiss some counts in a
complaint, dismiss other charges in the same or other juris16. In addition to the cases cited in note 14, supra, which have either directly or
impliedly permitted an attack on the credibility of both judge and defendant in this
process, there have been numerous authorities which have called this practice the
charade it is. United States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 138 (7th Cir. 1968) (Kiley, J.,
dissenting); TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE 159-60 (1964); Owens, supra
note 1, at 58; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967); ABA PROJECT, supra
note 1, at 63.
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dictions, dismiss charges against another person, or reduce the
filed charge to a lesser one.
Nearly all of these are commonly used bargaining subjects.17 Where
the defendant has pleaded guilty as a result of the prosecutor's promise
to do one or more of the above acts, the conviction is generally sustained if the State fulfills its share of the bargain.'" It would be to
defendant's advantage to have a record of the promises; for, if he can
show that the State has failed to fulfill those promises, most courts will
set aside the conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea
of guilty.'" When the agreement included a promise to dismiss other
charges, a record thereof would also serve to protect the defendant from
20
subsequent prosecution on those charges.
Often an agreement has been reached by the prosecution and the
defense attorney, but is, or is alleged to have been, misrepresented to
or misunderstood by the defendant. A record of the agreement, made
immediately prior to the acceptance of the plea and in the presence and
with the confirmation of the defendant, would point up any disparities
between the State's version and the defendant's understanding of the
agreement. If the defendant entered his plea pursuant to this agreement as developed in the record, he would ordinarily be precluded
from subsequently alleging that in fact he relied upon an agreement
inconsistent with that shown by the record.2 '
II. Promises by the state representatives to take action which is
not binding upon the court, i.e., a conspicuous example is a
promise to recommend a certain sentence or probation.
The promise to recommend is a common subject of bargaining and
seems to have received a rather good press so far as the philosophical
17. E.g., Reed v. State, 204 S.2d 26 (Fla. App. 1967) (promised to abandon other
pending count); Smith v. People, 162 Colo. 558, 428 P.2d 69 (1967) (promised not to
file other charges and not to file habitual criminal charge); People v. Eldredge, 41 Ill.
2d 520, 244 N.E.2d 151 (1969) (court inferred that the plea was offered in reliance
that other charges and charges in other jurisdictions would be dropped); State v.
Baumgardner, 79 N.M. 341, 443 P.2d 511 (1968) (defendant alleged he pleaded to
avoid the imposition of charges on his co-defendant's wife).
18. But see McClure v. Boles, 233 F. Supp. 928, 931 (N.D.W.Va. 1964) (in dicta
court indicated it would be improper for prosecution to condition its use of habitual
criminal act upon defendant's willingness to plead guilty).
19. E.g., Darnell v. Timpani, 68 Wash. 2d 666, 414 P.2d 782 (1966).
20. Although it is a common practice for the representatives of the state to promise

to dismiss the remainder of a number of charges in exchange for a plea of guilty to
one or two of the charged offenses, these agreements seldom find their way into the
record and it remains for the reviewing court to sift this out of the record in a bits-andpieces manner. See People v. Eldredge, 41 111. 2d 520, 526-27, 244 N.E.2d 151 (1969).
Illinois has taken steps to clarify and record the proceedings in this process. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §113-7 (1967).

21.

See State v. Adkison, 279 Minn. 1, 155 N.W.2d 394 (1967).
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wisdom of the process is concerned.22 However, the fact that the sentencing judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation leaves
this process open to misapprehension by the defendant, and thus the
process has been the subject of much subsequent litigation. The combination of defendant's allegations of misapprehension and state
answers thereto are numerous. It appears that some courts have distinguished among the allegations according to the defendant's sources
of information and the alleged origin of the promise. 3 The niceties of
these distinctions and much of the original confusion and misapprehension could have been avoided by adequate inquiries from the trial
court which would have disclosed: (1) that no agreement to recommend had been made;2 4 (2) that while an agreement to recommend had
been made, it was followed by a clear and express admonition by the
court to the defendant that such a recommendation was not binding on
the judge;25 or, (3) that not only did an agreement between the litigants
exist, but also that the court indicated that sentence would be in accordance with the agreed recommendation.26 This type of record would
more clearly reflect the defendant's state of mind and would eliminate
doubt as to whether all defendants are aware that the prosecution's
27
recommendation of sentence is not binding upon the court.
III. Cases in which the reviewing court concludes that there was
no agreement, but that defendant entered his plea in reliance
upon a representation or belief that an agreement existed.
The courts are split on whether the defendant's subjective mental
state, absent evidence of an agreement in fact, is a sufficient ground
to set aside a conviction. 8 In those jurisdictions where this is a basis
22. E.g., Rogers v. Wainwright, 394 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1968); Buckley v. Warden,
28 Conn. Sup. 15, 246 A.2d 705 (1968); Owens, supra note 1.
23. Some of the distinctions are set out in Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 808

(D.Utah 1968).

24. E.g., United States v. McClellan, 194 F. Supp. 128, 130 (W.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd, 289 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1961).

25. Numerous writers have proposed that the court caution the defendant as to its
independence from the recommendation of the prosecutor. Owens, supra note 1, at 58;
Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 895; ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, at §1.5.
Only the American Bar Association seems to have foreseen the obvious challenge of the
defendant, i.e., "But I thought (was told) that the judge had in fact agreed to the
recommendation". The ABA commentary cites People v. Baldridge, 19 I11.2d 616,
169 N.E.2d 353 (1960), where the reviewing court told the defendant that the trial
court meant what it said.
26. United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1968). The
judicial assent is not so well received by the writers. Comment, 32 U. CmH. L. REV. 167,
172 (1964); Owens, supra note 1, at 58 (1967).
But see Comment, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 1082, 1090 n.58 (1967). As indicated earlier (text accompanying note 7, supra),
the ABA proposals permit judicial assent.
27. See State v. Popejoy, 9 Ariz. App. 170, 450 P.2d 411 (1969).
28. Subjective mental state is grounds: United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 293
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for reversal, the process of making an adequate record would have confronted the defendant with the divergence between the facts as they
existed and his belief of what the facts were. The defendant could
then withdraw his proffered plea or at least plead guilty with more
accurate knowledge of the consequences. This practice would remove
much of the appeal-reversal-remandment process which follows all too
often from present practices, 2 and would also reduce the need for
post-conviction hearings.t °
IV. Cases in which the court is involved as a party to the agreement.
The addition of the trial court as a party to the negotiations and
agreement, as a matter of judicial philosophy, seems to diminish the
chances of the plea being held valid, particularly when the court is
the initiator of the discussions.3 1 I should make entirely clear my belief that plea negotiation ought not to be initiated by the judge except
in most unusual circumstances. Of course, even where an agreement
involving judicial participation is philosophically acceptable, there can
be factual disputes as to whether any agreement existed, its terms and
whether it was breached, just as in a non-judicial agreement.3 2 Agreements to which the trial court is a party are placed in one category
because this common characteristic, judicial participation, makes them
appear difficult to sustain; further, it may well be precisely this factor
which has, in the past, caused the trial judge and the parties to avoid
record acknowledgement of judicial participation.
It seems to me safe to assume that a substantial number of trial
'
judges are involved in plea agreements,33
and that fewer defendants
would plead if there were no prior judicial assents to the sentence
recommendations offered by the prosecution. As heretofore indicated,
F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States cx rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F.
Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Rife, 260 Iowa 598, 149 N.W.2d 846 (1967);
People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 107 N.E.2d 721 (1952); People v. Cassiday, 90
Ill. App. 2d 132, 232 N.E.2d 795 (1967); State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969).

Subjective state is not grounds:

Simmons v. Gladden, -

Ore. -,

446 P.2d 675

(1968); State v. Knerr, 440 P.2d 808 (N.M. App. 1968).
29. E.g., People v. Riebe, 40 Ill. 2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968).
30. E.g., Gibson v. Boles, 288 F. Supp. 472 (N.D.W.Va. 1968); United States
ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Rose, 440
S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969); People v. Walston, 38 Ill. 2d 39, 230 N.E.2d 233 (1967);
State v. Larkins, 450 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1969); State v. Rife, 260 Iowa 598, 149 N.W.2d
846 (1967).
31. See United States v. Schmidt, 376 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1967); United States
ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Comment, 19 STAN.
L. REV. 1082 (1967).
32. E.g., United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 293 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
33. E.g., People v. Carter, 91 111. App. 2d 120, 235 N.E.2d 382 (1968).

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 1: 1

I do not view this as impermissible, but it does necessitate careful and
adequate reference in the record as to the parties and the nature and
terms of any resulting agreement in order that subsequent problems
arising from allegations of coercive influences may be avoided.
Probably advocacy of a somewhat substantial procedural change
ought to be accompanied by some suggestion for its implementationassuming it merits implementation at all. Review of the trial and appellate litigation stemming from plea negotiations and agreements indicates
the time is ripe for improvement in procedures which have prevailed in
the past. Accomplishment of this objective could result from any one
of several methods.
First, it should be noted that there already are some reported cases
where the trial court has used some of the procedures advocated herein. 34
Other courts have expressed their approval of such procedures.8"
Secondly, parties in criminal litigation may offer to make a record of
the agreement, or state for the record the non-existence of any such
agreement, to protect themselves in the future whether from breach of
7
the agreement 6 or from subsequent litigation.1
Thirdly, the practice might be required by judicial rule. Federal
Rule 11 contains rather broad language which prohibits the court from
accepting a plea of guilty without first "addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea."
(Fed. R. Crim. P. 11). Although no court has expressly construed
this to require a complete examination of plea negotiations and a statement of the agreement,38 some opinions could be interpreted as being
34. E.g., United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States ex rel. Amuso v. LaVallee, 291 F. Supp. 383, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)
(judge stated the agreement as represented to him and asked defendant if he understood its terms); State v. Jennings, 104 Ariz. 3, 448 P.2d 59 (1969).
35. Rigby v. Russell, 287 F. Supp. 325, 332 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (citing the
American Bar Association proposals); United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275
F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
36. E.g., Buckley v. Warden, 28 Conn. Sup. 15, 246 A.2d 705 (1968).
In State
v. Ortiz, 77 N.M. 751, 427 P.2d 264, the prosecutor had promised not to proceed
under the Habitual Criminal Act, but, after plea was entered, the prosecutor breached his
promise and the trial court refused to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea stating
that his negative answer to the typical "Have any promises been made" barred him.
See McClure v. Boles, 233 F. Supp. 928 (N.D.W. Va. 1964).
37. In State v. Hansen, 79 N.M. 203, 441 P.2d 500 (1968), the opinion relates
that after the guilty plea was accepted "the district attorney then announced that he
could not recommend leniency due to the nature of the crime, and stated that he
wanted the record to show that he had never before seen the defendant, in order to
preclude any claim in a subsequent Rule 93 proceeding that he had made any promises
of leniency. Defendant admitted the correctness of the district attorney's statement."
(441 P. 2d at 505); See State v. Adkison, 279 Minn. 1, 155 N.W.2d 394 (1967).

38.

But see Scott v. United States, -F.2d-

(D.C. Cir. 1969) (37 L.W. 2463).
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in support of such a construction. 9
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that failure to
comply fully with guilty-plea-providency inquiry requirements of Federal Rule 11 requires outright reversal of the conviction and opportunity
to plead anew. 40 However, the Court gave no indication that Rule 11
required an inquiry into the existence of a plea agreement. 4
Illinois already has a Supreme Court rule requiring the trial court to
make certain specific inquiries prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea
and requiring that a record be made of the proceedings; 42 however,
there is no indication that this rule requires that the existence of plea
bargaining be inquired into, other than in so far as such inquiry might
be thought to be embraced within the requirement that a defendant
shall be examined to determine whether he has "understandingly"
pleaded or waived certain rights.
Of the possible methods above outlined for incorporating into the
record an adequate summary of plea negotiations, my own notion is that
this is best accomplished by rule of the highest state court. Only in
this fashion will any reasonable semblance of uniform practices result.
Such a rule should require every judge when a plea of guilty is tendered
in any criminal case to inquire of counsel whether there has been any
discussion or agreement as to the disposition of that case, or other related
or unrelated charges. Should counsel state there have been none, the
court must then make similar inquiry of defendant, if he is present
(and he would be, at least in the felony cases).
The rule should further provide that if plea negotiations have
occurred with some resulting agreement, the prosecutor should be requested to state the substance of the agreement and the parties thereto.
Verification of the prosecutor's statement by defense counsel and defendant would be required with such correction or addition as is necessary to correctly portray the understanding. If judicial participation has
occurred, a summary statement by the judge as to the extent thereof
would be necessary, again with verification by counsel and defendant.
Pursuit of this inquiry should be continued until all counsel, defendant
and the court are agreed that the record adequately reflects the correct
result of the plea negotiations.
39. United States v. Howard, 407 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1969).
40. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
41. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Court raised some of the
provisions of Rule 11 to constitutional stature, although again there was no mention of
plea bargaining.
42. Il. S. Ct. R. 401; see ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, §113.4 (1967).
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In the ordinary case this procedure will be completed within a matter
of several minutes and no substantial extension of the record will
occur. It is only where disagreement as to the results of the plea discussions develops that appreciable amounts of time or record space will
be consumed. It is precisely there that the later problems would have
arisen had prior inquiry not been made.
I am reasonably certain that a number of judges are now engaging
in inquiries similar to those suggested. But I am also reasonably certain
that in many other courts no realistic effort is made along these lines.
It is in those courts that the problems typified by the cases herein cited
will continue to arise. I submit that adoption of the suggested procedure will measurably reduce the amount of post-conviction and appellate litigation now arising from alleged unfulfilled promises or coercive tactics involved in undisclosed plea negotiations; and, further, that
resolution of those questions which do arise can be more intelligently,
fairly and safely accomplished on the basis of a record which adequately
portrays the facts.

